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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD H. HOLDER, 
Respondent and Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
RUTH M. HOLDER, 
Appellant and Defendant. 
Case 
No. 8984 
BRIEF OF APP·ELLANT 
STATE11ENT OF FACTS 
In the early part of 1956 the plaintiff, then 19, was 
going steady with defendant, then Ruth Ratcliffe, age 
17, and in her junior year in high school (R. 86, lines 13-
16, R. 45, line 29). The parties had discussed marriage. 
They were having sexual relations and had discussed 
this with a seminary teacher (R. 67, line 13; R. 69, line 
25). In May of that year, plaintiff went to \York in 
Alaska and expected to return in September (R. 30, lines 
20-22). Defendant was in love with plaintiff and wanted 
to marry him (R. 30, lines 23, 24). Plaintiff's parents 
knew the parties were seriously interested in each other 
(R. 77, lines 5-10). Plaintiff did not return from Alaska 
until in December 1956. Plaintiff's parents took defend-
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Bnt "'ith them on a trip to California where they met 
plaintiff on December 24, 1956, at Monterey (R. 46, lines 
1-5). Plaintiff and defendant had sexual intercourse that 
night (R. 46, lines 11-19) and many acts of intercourse 
between then and the return trip to Utah on December 29, 
1956 (R. 29, lines 3-14). In the forepart of January of 
January of 1957, a rabbit test showed that defendant was 
pregnant (R. 24, lines 27-30). Plaintiff's mother urged 
him to marry defendant (R. 77, lines 2-4). On Feb-
ruary 2, 1957, the parties were married at Salt Lake City, 
Utah (R. 45, lines 23-27). Thereafter the parties lived 
together with Mr. Holder's parents until :.Jiay 4, 1957, 
when he left to work in Alaska again (R. 49, lines 4-6). 
Defendant had first consulted Dr. Juel E. Trowbridge 
of Bountiful where she was living prior to her marriage 
to plaintiff (R. 25, lines 4-10). On :.Jiarch 29, 1957, she 
went to see Dr. Yon G. Holbrook who attended her there-
after since she had moved to Salt Lake City after her 
marriage (R. lines 12-14). The baby -was expected, 
according to defendant, on September 15, 1957 (R. 49, 
lines 14-16), although Dr. Holbrook estimated she was 
farther along than that (R. 33, lines 3-6). Plaintiff wrote 
:dfpctionate letters to defendant about three times a week 
after he left until the bahy was born (R. 50, lines 9-17). 
Plaintiff plnnned to haYe defendant join him in Alaska 
a ft<'r the bah~- wns born (R. 30. lines 22-23). A female 
rhi1d named Dt'hhie Holder was born on August 13, 195·7, 
:1nd wt'ig-IH'd 6 pounds and 1~ ounces (R. 22, line I; 
J\ .. :27, li1w 10). The birth was sooner than anticipated 
(H. ~i>, li1ws 17-28; H. 63, line 28-R. 64. line 5). 
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Plaintiff assumed right after the baby was born that 
the child was not his (R. 81, lines 1-27). Defendant made 
repeated efforts to discuss plaintiff's attitude with him 
but never was able to talk to him privately except for 
one instance two weeks before the trial (R. 82, lines 1-12). 
She voluntarily had blood tests taken (R. 82, lines 13-19). 
Plaintiff refused to resume the marital relationship and 
filed this action on January 22, 1958. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE CHILD IN QUESTION WAS NOT A "FULL 
TERM" BABY. 
PoiNT II 
DEFENDANT DID NOT TELL PLAINTIFF'S 
FATHER THAT SHE TOLD HER MOTHER SHE 
WAS GOING TO BE PREGNANT WHEN SHERE-
TURNED FROl\f CALIFORNIA. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT DID NOT TELL PLAINTIFF'S 
:MOTHER AFTER THE BABY WAS BORN THAT 
SHE HAD MISSED A MENSTRUAL PERIOD PRIOR 
TO l\fEETING PLAINTIFF AND CONTACTED HER 
DOCTOR CONCERNING IT. 
PoiNT IV 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT PREGNANT ON DE-
CEMBER 24, 1956, AND PLAINTIFF IS THE 
FATHER OF THE CHILD IN QUESTION. 
'.) 
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PoiNT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I 
THE CHILD IN QUESTION WAS NOT A "FULL 
TERM" BABY. 
According to plaintiff's own medical expert, Dr. Von 
G. Holbrook, who delivered the child, the baby was "near 
term" (R. 57, line 24). Additionally, the term "prema-
ture" and "term" are used in the medical profession to 
indicate stage of development of the baby rather than 
period of gestation (R. 66, lines 8-15). Thus, the evidence 
does not support Finding of Fact No. 8. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT DID NOT TELL PLAINTIFF'S 
FATHER THAT SHE TOLD HER 11:0THER SHE 
WAS GOING TO BE PREGNANT \VHEN SHERE-
TURNED FROM CALIFORNIA. 
It is hardly likely that a. single girl would in effect tell 
a young man's father that she planned to become preg-
nant by the son. Defendant emphatically denied such 
testimony of plaintiff's father (R. 23, lines 26-30). 
If defendant in fact had made such a statement, it is 
hardly likely that the father would not warn his single 
son before such might occur and yet plaintiff's father 
admitted he did not do so (R. 41, lines 7-10). Plaintiff's 
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mother goes even further and says she discussed defend-
ant's desire to become pregnant by her son before leaving 
for California yet made no attempt to warn her son or 
properly chaperon these young people (R. 76, line 1-R. 
77, line 1). Yet despite her positive testimony of a plan 
to trap her son, she nevertheless urged the boy to marry 
defendant against his will (R. 77, lines 2, 3). Such tes-
timony of naturally biased witnesses ought to be con-
sidered cautiously. When it is so contrary to the course 
of conduct one would normally expect, it ought not to 
form the basis of a decision so important and drastic as 
is this case. Additional evidence on this point will be 
discussed under Point V. Thus, the evidence does not 
support Finding of Fact No. 9. Even if it did, that would 
hardly prove that plaintiff did not become the father 
thereafter. 
PoiNT III 
DEFENDANT DID NOT TELL PLAINTIFF'S 
:MOTHER AFTER rrHE BABY WAS BORN THAT 
SHE HAD 1\fiSSED A MENSTRUAL PERIOD PRIOR 
TO ~IEETING PLAINTIFF AND CON~rACTED HER 
DOCTOR CO~CERNING IT. 
Defendant vigorously denied plaintiff's mother's tes-
timony of such an admission (R. 89, lines 2-7). One who 
desired to continue her marriage after having a child 
born before the due date of a premarital conception cer-
tainly would not admit missing a menstrual period just 
prior to possible conception date with the husband, espe-
cially not to the husband's mother. The occasion on which 
plaintiff's mother claimed this occurred was at the very 
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time defendant was discussing with her mother-in-law her 
plans to rejoin her husband (R. 74, lines 5, 6). Accord-
ing to plaintiff's witness, defendant had just been placed 
on guard that the mother-in-law suspected the child was 
not her son's (R. 74, lines 17-19). If such testimony were 
true and the doctor could be required to testify as to its 
actuality, then plaintiff's case would definitely be proved 
and the matter settled. In order to make it possible for 
the case to be settled on this one crucial point, defendant 
through her counsel (R. 77, lines 19-25) gave plaintiff 
that opportunity. Not having availed himself of the best 
possible evidence to prove this point, and for obvious 
reasons since plaintiff knew, according to Dr. Trowbridge, 
what this doctor's testimony would be, the presumption 
must be drawn that such evidence would be adverse. It 
is significant that no mention is made of this testimony in 
the Court's J\1emorandum Decision (R. 106). Evidence 
from Dr. Juel E. Trowbridge on this aspect of the case 
will be discussed under Point V. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT PREGXA~T OX DE-
CEMBER 24, 1956, AND PLAIXTIFF IS THE 
FATHER OF THE CHILD IN QUESTIOX. 
This, of course, is the crucial issue. \Yas defendant 
with another man who might be the father of this child'? 
No. She swore she was not (R. 30, lines 12-17). \Yere 
there any special reasons for defendant not going out 'Yith 
other fellows during the possible conception period? Yes. 
Ruth Ratcliffe was in love with Richard Holder. She 
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wanted to marry him (R. 67, line 13-R. 69, line 25). She 
had been expecting him to return from Alaska since Sep-
tember of that year (R. 30, line 20-22). 
There is no proof in the record that anyone else had 
an opportunity to be the father of the child. In order to 
eliminate any temptation, however, to read between the 
lines from plaintiff's assertions in Answers to Interroga-
tories and questions relating to one 1\'Iax Jones (R. 36, 
line 23), defendant respectfully represents that blood 
tests taken on Max Jones subsequent to the time for pre-
senting new evidence exclude him as a possible father of 
this baby. At the time of defendant's Motion for a New 
Trial, a letter from the Blood Grouping Laboratory of 
the Salt Lake General Hospital so stating was presented 
to the trial judge, and he stated that his decision was not 
in any way affected by any possibility relating to 
l\[ax Jones. 
Do the medical facts require the conclusion that de-
fendant was pregnant on December 24, 1956, so that plain-
tiff could not have been the father of Debbie Holder1 
Dr. Von G. Holbrook (plaintiff's ·witness) testified 
that while it was not probable, it was possible that this 
child was as much as six weeks short of term (R. 58, 
line 5). Also he reiterated his testimony in a prior depo-
sition in which he said, "We have all seen many cases 
where the baby can be premature and weigh as much as 
twelve pounds - or six pounds, twelve ounces. I have 
had many cases myself where the baby may be six months, 
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permature, and weigh six pounds and twelve ounces.'' 
(R. 65, lines 25-29) 
Dr. Lyman M. Horne stated he had a few cases each 
year during the last twenty years in which he detected the 
fetal heartbeat in the fifteenth or sixteenth week of preg-
nancy (R. 92, line 15). The 1938 work of Dr. Williams on 
Obstetrics (6th Edition) states that the fetal heartbeat 
has been heard as early as the twelfth week (R. 97, lines 
1-6). Today modern instruments make it possible to hear 
the heartbeat even earlier than in 1938 (R. 63, lines 6-15). 
The trial court recognized that the strongest pre-
sumptions exist in favor of legitimacy under our rules of 
law (R. 107) but was of the opinion that the gestation 
period was 48 days less than normal and such variation 
was sufficient to overcome the presumption (R. 107). 
The normal period of 280 days is computed not from the 
date of conception but from the first day of the last 
monthly period (R. 95, lines 21 - 27). The period of 232 
days used by the trial court, however, ·was computed from 
the date of first contact of the parties on December 24, 
1956 (R. 22, line 21) rather than from the beginning of 
the monthly period, which was November 25, 1956 (R. 23, 
line 2). Considerable confusion has resulted from the 
failure to recognize the difference between the two differ-
ent periods. The best explanation of this ''1hirh appellm1t 
has found is in the case of Da,zey v. Dazey. 122 P. 2d 308, 
in which the California court stated: 
""\Vhat is meant hy the words 'period of ges-
tation' f HerP we have an apparent misnomer. The 
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word 'gestation' is defined by the dictionary as 
being the period of time in which a woman carries 
a fetus in her womb, from conception to birth. But, 
as used in all medical authorities this phrase does 
not mean the actual number of days from concep-
tion to birth. One cannot take the date of birth as 
a starting point and count backwards so many 
days and say that a child was epnceived on any 
particular date, even within limitations of as much 
as sixty days. The average period of gestation 
\Vhich the medical term connotes is from 270 to 
290 days from the last menstrual period of the 
mother. As a medico-legal term this phrase does 
not mean now, nor has it ever meant, that 'length 
of gestation' is from 270 to 290 days from the date 
of conception to the date of birth of a child. 
" 'The actu~l duration of pregnancy is not yet 
known, but ordinarily two hundred and eighty 
days, or ten lunar months, elapse between the com-
mencement of the last menstrual flow and the 
onset of labor, though a considerable number of 
children are born shortly before or after the expi-
ration of that period.' Williams' Obstetrics, Sixth 
Edition, page 163. 
''In the case at bar, in considering the possible 
natural length of gestation of this child, we must 
take the 225 days alleged in the complaint as 
elapsing from the date of marriage to the date of 
birth, and we must add an additional 25 days at 
least, making a total possible and natural period of 
gestation of 250 days. rrhis is so because we must 
assume that conception of the child took place on 
the night of the marriage. (Estate of McNamara, 
supra, 181 Cal. at page 88, 183 P. 552, 7 A.L.R. 
313); we must also assume that this child was 
conceived just before the end of the mother's re-
current monthly menstrual period of 28 days. 
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'But,' says someone, 'you are computing from a 
time 25 days before marriage of this mother. How 
can that be~' The answer is that we are applying 
an empirical measure of time, and it is the measure 
which we are using which extends the possible and 
natural number of days, to a time before the date 
of the marriage. To illustrate: If this lady, be-
lieving she was pregnant, had gone to her doctor 
to inquire the probable date of birth of the child, 
the doctor would have used 280 days from her last 
menstrual period, regardless of the date of the 
marriage, and he would (if it were 25 days before 
the marriage) have computed from that earlier 
date. The whole matter is discussed in DeLee's 
Principles and Practice of Obstetrics, Fourth Edi-
tion, page 25 : 
'' 'It is important to know the time pregnancy 
begins, but unfortunately, we are in a position as 
yet only to guess at the exact date. The knowledge 
is wanted in order to determine the day of confine-
ment and the actual length of human gestation for 
practical reasons, for the scientific study of the 
development of the ovum in the uterus, and for 
medico-legal processes in the question of legiti-
macy of a child or its paternity. All the points on 
which such a determination could rest are uncer-
tain, as: (1) The date of the fruitful coitus (the 
woman's word must be accepted); (2) the date 
the ovum left the ovary, and ·whether it was fer-
tilizable or not; (3) how long it takes the ovum to 
reach the tube and uterus; ( 4) how long it takes 
the spermatozoids to reach the ovum; ( 5) how 
long the fertilized ovum rests before it begins to 
germinate - all unknown factors.' 
* * * * * 
''This author also plainly states that if we 
compute the period from fruitful coition to birth, 
JO 
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it varies from 220 days to 330 days (J;r:inciples 
and Pra.ctice of Obstetrics, Sixth Edition, chapter 
5, page 120, by Joseph B. DeLee, A.M., M.D., Pro-
fessor of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Eberitus, 
University of Chicago, Consultant in Obstetrics, 
Chicago Lying-In Hospital and Dispensary; Con-
sultant in Obstetrics, Chicago Maternity Center) : 
'The most reliable datum from which to estimate 
the beginning is the date of fruitful coition, and, 
reckoning from this day, pregnancy has been 
found to vary from two hundred and twenty to 
three hundred and thirty days, the average being 
two hundred and seventy days. * * * From 
time immemorial women have reckoned two hun-
dred and eighty days, ten lunar months, or nine 
calendar months, from the first day of the last 
period as the length of normal gestation, and for 
practical purposes this may be accepted, because 
in the majority of cases it holds true, but one must 
remember and admit the exceptions. No doubt 
some children require a longer time in the uterus 
for full development than others. Some seeds in 
favorable soil grow faster than others. The 
writer has delivered children that were carried 
eight months that were as matured as full-term 
infants, and also in one case, he delivered a child 
weighing three and one-half pounds which was 
fully three weeks over term. Heyn had a case of 
two hundred and twenty-nine days', pregnancy, 
with child of 2980 gm. and 50 em. length.' (AbO-ut 
6¥2 pounds)." 
In that case it was held as a matter of law' that a mature 
child born 225 days (7 days less than the period in the 
case at bar) after marriage \Vas legitimate. 
Dr. Lyman M. Horne testified in answer to hypotheti-
cal questions propounded to him by plaintiff's attorney 
11 
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which included all the known factors indicating the period 
of gestation in this case that on March 29, 1957, the preg-
nancy would be between thirteen and eighteen weeks since 
date of conception (R. 99, line 6-R.100, line 8). If concep-
tion took place on December 24, 1956, the date of first 
intercourse between the parties, defendant would have 
been pregnant 13 weeks plus 4 days). 
If determination of legitimacy depends upon whether 
the conception date is not only within the range of medi-
cally possible limitations but also within the statistically 
more numerous group within that range as well, the pre-
sumption can hardly be denominated as strong. The best 
that can be said for plaintiff's medical evidence is that it 
shows that this is a rare case if plaintiff is the father (R. 
57, lines 15, 16, also R. 59, line 30-R. 60, line 10). 
In the later California case of Gonzales -v. Pacific 
Greyhound Lines, 202 P. 2d 135, the decision of Dazey v. 
Dazey was cited with approval in holding that a fully de-
veloped child which was born 234 days after marriage 
would be conclusively presumed to be legitimate child of 
the marriage. The court there affirmed the rule as set 
forth in In Estate of lr alker, 180 Cal. 478, 181 P. 792, as 
follows: 
* * * the true rule in America, as well as 
England, is, we belieYe, that if it is possible by the 
laws of nature for the husband to be the father 
(that is, if there was coition and no impotency), 
no inquiry will be permitted into the probabilities 
of the case OlH' way or the other, but the presump-
tion of legitimacy is conclusiYe; and, on the other 
hand, it is always permitted to show that it ·was 
1:2 
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not possible by the laws of nature for the husband 
to be the father, as by showing impotency on his 
part, want of intercourse during the possible 
period of conception or that the child is of a race 
or color such that it could not have been conceived 
by the husband." 
The presumption of legitimacy is only conclusive in 
California where it is "probable," "usual," "average" 
or "normal" that the child was conceived in wedlock and 
does not apply where it is merely "possible" to have been 
so conceived. In the latter situation the preumption is a 
rebuttable one. 
The cases cited above indicate that the period of 
232 days in this case is not rare. Afortiori, the period is 
not one which indicates that the child is not plaintiff's 
according to the laws of nature. In fact this is recognized 
by the trial judge in his Memorandum Decision (R. 107). 
In view of the lack of evidence of any fraud com-
mitted by defendant, the dictum in the decision of the 
Utah Supreme Court in the case of Bement v. Bement, 
172 P. 2d 996, is not applicable. If such fraud were estab-
lished, the moral principle thus set forth there would 
apply to this case and the timing of the bubble pricking 
would not affect its application. 
POINT v 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
A~T'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The testimony of defendant's mother in accordance 
with her affidavit in support of defendant's motion for a 
13 
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new trial (R. 118) certainly ought to be received in de-
termining whether or not defendant made the statement 
to plaintiff's father as set forth in Finding of Fact No.9. 
The testimony of Dr. Juel E. Trowbridge in accord-
ance with his affidavit in support of defendant's motion 
for a new trial (R. 117) should have been received to rebut 
hearsay statements attributed to defendant by plaintiff's 
mother concerning her possible pregnancy before going 
to California, particularly in light of defendant's waiver 
of privilege as to any communication with him (R. 77, 
lines 19-25) and plaintiff's failure to call him to prove 
such a fact. Dr. Trowbridge would have testified that it 
was not true that defendant had consulted with him about 
possibility of pregnancy prior to December 24, 1956, and 
furthermore that he had told plaintiff and his parents 
this before the trial. 
One can only conclude that the court did not base 
its decision on such evidence, which is consistent with 
the fact no mention was made of it in the 1\Iemorandum 
Decision (R. 106) and would have ruled the same way 
despite the testimony of Dr. Trowbridge. Otherwise, the 
court surely would have received such direct evidence 
which was so conflicting with the hearsay evidence at 
trial in a case of such magnitude as this. 
CONCLUSION 
The decree of annulment of the District Court of Salt 
Lake County should be Yacated and the cause remanded 
to the District Court to ascertain the proper amount, if 
14 
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any, for plaintiff to pay defendant for alimony, support 
money, and counsel fees, and to enter a decree of divorce 
in favor of defendant and against plaintiff accordingly. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT H. HANSEN 
Attorney for Appellant 
65 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
15 
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